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ABSTRACT 
Social media have great potential to support diverse information sharing, but there is widespread 
concern that platforms like Twitter do not result in communication between those who hold 
contradictory viewpoints.  Because users can choose whom to follow, prior research suggests 
that social media users exist in “echo chambers” or become polarized. We seek evidence of this 
in a complete cross section of hyperlinks posted on Twitter, using previously validated measures 
of the political slant of news sources to study information diversity.  Contrary to prediction, we 
find that the average account posts links to more politically moderate news sources than the ones 
they receive in their own feed. However, members of a tiny network core do exhibit cross-
sectional evidence of polarization and are responsible for the majority of tweets received overall 
due to their popularity and activity, which could explain the widespread perception of 
polarization on social media.    
 
Keywords: Social media, diversity, homophily, echo chambers, polarization, network analysis, 
political slant 
 
  
2 
 
Network structure and patterns of information diversity on Twitter 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Because anyone can post and re-share content, social media has been connected to 
increased participation and diversity of expression, raising hopes for a role for social media in 
promoting innovation, building social capital and empowering workers within firms and in 
society in general (An et al., 2011; Bertot, et al., 2010; Kane et. al, 2009; Woodly, 2008).  Given 
the opportunities available in big data and the imperative to make use of them (LaValle, et al, 
2013), business leaders have turned in increasing numbers to analyzing social media data in 
order to learn from customers (Culnan, McHugh, and Zubillaga, 2010; He, Zha and Li, 2013; 
Chen, Chiang, and Storey, 2012), and computer scientists have developed many tools to help 
achieve these ends (see e.g. Pang and Lee, 2008).  Firms have also adopted internal social 
networking platforms in great numbers.  Yammer, a popular enterprise social networking 
platform, claims to be used by more than 500,000 firms, including 85% of the Fortune 500 
(Yammer, 2015).  
It is easy to see why many see social media as potentially valuable external sources and 
internal conduits of diverse knowledge (Kane, Majchrzak and Ives, 2010). Innovation has long 
been seen as deriving from recombining diverse ideas (Schumpeter, 1934), and diverse ideas are 
assumed to flow through diverse networks (Hampton, Lee, and Her, 2011) like those created by 
connecting a diverse user base via social media. In general, diversity among individuals is 
thought to lead to better performance in solving problems (Hong and Page, 2004) and modern 
crowdsourcing approaches to innovation would seem to thrive on the fuel of diversity (Jeppesen 
and Lakhani, 2010).   
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However, information technologies, while providing historically unprecedented potential 
for free public expression, also provide self-regulating mechanisms that allow users to customize 
content feeds. In making these choices, people tend to connect with similar others (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001) and seek out information that confirms their previously-held 
beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). It is therefore unclear if the diverse points of view of social media 
users ever actually come into contact with each other, or if they cyber-balkanize themselves into 
“echo chambers” in which they are only exposed to ideas they already hold (Van Alstyne and 
Brynjolffson, 2005).  
Many of the most lucid and powerful research studies on this topic to date have been in 
the setting of political information diversity and communication – a setting we also study in the 
present paper.  In addition to being economically and societally consequential, political 
communication is an appealing setting for the study of information diversity: there is a clear left-
right spectrum of opinion, which simplifies the difficult issue of how to measure diversity in a 
meaningful way (Page, 2010).  Additionally, it is not too much of a stretch to view political 
communication among social media users in the United States as an example of a market for 
information in which two principal organizations (the Democratic and Republican political 
parties) are competing for attention and influence.   
In prior literature, there is some evidence in favor of a tendency to echo chambers, some 
evidence in favor of polarization and still other evidence in favor of a tendency for people to 
limit themselves to expression of moderate and mainstream ideas on social media (see discussion 
in Section 2).  We believe that a likely reason for the conflicted nature of the literature is that 
earlier work has generally focused too narrowly on unrepresentative or incomplete data sets.  
Social networks and online communities often have a core-periphery structure consisting of a 
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highly interconnected core of important and active nodes, surrounded by a larger, less densely 
connected periphery (Borgatti and Everett, 2000; Dahlander and Fredriksen, 2012, Wu, et al., 
2011).  
By focusing on highly active users, prior research on the phenomena of echo chambers 
and polarization has arguably only emphasized the study of the network core, whose behavior is 
not representative of the average user of the platform (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover, et al, 
2011; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015). Moreover, it could even be argued that by 
constructing their data sets by including only those individuals with clear partisan affiliation 
(Adamic and Glance, 2005; Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015), or those who posted about 
politically divisive topics (Conover, et al., 2011; Barbera et al., 2015), prior research studied only 
users prone to political division and therefore sheds little light on the nature of social media in 
general.  Due to its traditional survey methodology, Hampton, et al. (2014) does not have this 
limitation but on the other hand it also cannot answer those questions which would require large-
scale network data as evidence.  
Here, we seek to reconcile the differing perspectives on patterns of diversity in social 
media with a study of a nearly complete cross-section of Twitter posts (“tweets”) containing 
hyperlinks to news stories, together with the associated follower network data.  Our data set 
includes 908,000 tweets posted by 215,174 users based on a 300 hour data set, representing a 
nearly complete record of all such activity on Twitter during the collection period. We test 
hypotheses implied by prior research as well as characterize the overall structure of the Twitter 
follower network with respect to ideological diversity.  Because we have the follower graph, we 
are also able to relate the slant of the information an account receives to the slant of the 
information they post themselves.  Rather than echo chambers or cross-sectional evidence of 
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polarization, we find that, on average, Twitter accounts post links to more politically moderate 
(but not necessarily centrist) news sources than the links they receive in their own feed. Members 
of a tiny but highly followed network core behave differently from the typical user, however, and 
post links to sources that are more politically extreme than what they receive in their own 
newsfeeds.   While our empirical setting is political slant, we believe that the implications go 
beyond this narrow application and provide a basis for understanding the structure of self-
organization in social media more generally. 
 
2. THEORIES OF INFORMATION DIVERSITY ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
No one can read every article or interact with every user on the internet; instead, internet 
users must make choices about where to direct their attention.  Given the human tendency toward 
homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001) and confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), 
social media users are likely to follow other users whose opinions are similar to their own.  At 
the extreme, this could lead to fragmentation of users into ideologically narrow groups, in which 
people are only exposed to information that confirms their previously-held opinions (Van 
Alstyne and Brynjolffson, 2005; Burt, 2004). We refer to this as the “echo chambers” theory of 
social media. Empirical studies have confirmed some of these fears: there is a tendency for blogs 
with the same political and ideological inclination to link to each other (Adamic and Glance, 
2005; Conover, et al, 2011; Hargittai, Gallo and Kane, 2008) and a tendency of readers to engage 
with a small subset of content (Schmidt, et al., 2017) aligned with their ideological preferences 
(Lawrence, Sides and Farrell, 2010). Homophilous behavior is then magnified by algorithmic 
information filters on certain social media sites such as Facebook (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 
2015; Lazer, 2015). 
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A related view says that homophily may not lead people to be disconnected and ignorant 
of opposing views, as echo chambers theory would have it.  Instead, the relationship between 
groups of connected individuals may be mutually aware and antagonistic. Sunstein (2002, 2008) 
argues that when like-minded individuals discuss a controversial topic, there is a tendency for 
them to adopt an even more extreme position on that topic than they initially held. Barbera et al. 
(2015) document this process unfolding over time in partisan debate of controversial issues on 
Twitter.  Conover et al. (2011) show that while people “retweet”1 like-minded others on Twitter, 
they “@-mention”2 users they disagree with in the context of argument and other negative 
commentary.  The prevalence of @-mentions illustrates that although conservatives and liberals 
do not retweet each other’s content, they are indeed aware of each other and may even follow 
each other.  In short, on Twitter, people belong to groups that are antagonistic, not ignorant of 
each other. We refer to this as the “polarization” theory of social media. 
Despite all of this evidence, however, the idea that social media users segregate 
themselves into homogenous or polarized communities is far from an established fact.  Some 
have theorized that while social network ties may tend to be formed among similar others, there 
are many dimensions along which that similarity may be manifest (Watts, Dodds, and Newman, 
2002) and social media users may be connected not only to people with whom they agree 
politically, but also to people with whom they share other similarities, such as workplace, alma 
mater and so on.  This phenomenon of simultaneous contact with people from different contexts 
has been called “context collapse” and can lead users to limit their expression of potentially 
controversial beliefs (Marwick and boyd, 2010; see also Bernstein (2012) for a similar finding in 
                                                     
1 To “retweet” is to re-share a message one has received with one’s own followers 
2 On Twitter an “@-mention” is to include another user’s handle in a tweet (post), prepended with an @ sign, which 
uniquely identifies the specific individual, creates a clickable hyperlink to their profile page and notifies the target 
individual that they have been mentioned in the tweet. 
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an organizational context). Centola and Macy (2007) argue that certain phenomena – including 
potentially controversial expressions such as political beliefs – are most likely to occur and exert 
influence in the context of a highly clustered network such that there is the possibility of 
receiving multiple reinforcing signals from one’s network neighbors.   These recent theories echo 
the pre-internet theory of public opinion that people tend to articulate what they perceive to be 
the mainstream point of view or withhold their voice entirely, creating a “spiral of silence” for 
minority viewpoints (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).  Finally, to the extent that individuals fear they 
are being surveilled by government actors, they may share more politically moderate views in 
public than those they actually hold (see Stoycheff, 2016). Collectively, we refer to these ideas as 
the “mainstreaming” theory of social media. 
There is empirical support for the mainstreaming narrative of social media use as well. 
On average, it has been found that people are much less likely to discuss controversial topics on 
social media than in private (Hampton et al. 2014).  For political hashtags on Twitter, repeated 
exposures are important precursors to an individual's adoption of those hashtags in their own 
posts (Romero, Meeder and Kleinberg, 2011), which could be interpreted as seeking repeated 
confirmation from their community before sharing something potentially controversial.   
Our primary goal is to consider evidence for and against the theories of echo chambers, 
polarization, and mainstreaming. In this and the following sections, we therefore ask what we 
would expect to find in a complete cross-section of Twitter posts if the above theories were in 
fact true. We articulate a number of detailed hypotheses to test on this basis, but our overarching 
questions are simply whether Twitter shows evidence of widespread (1) echo chambers (2) 
polarization and/or (3) mainstreaming.  Before going into these specific theories, we state the 
relatively uncontroversial hypothesis that social media users display homophily. In other words, 
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we would expect the typical Twitter user to tweet links to news sources with similar political 
slant to the slant of the content they receive from the people they follow: we expect followers 
and followees to tweet at a similar level of political slant (we define how we measure slant 
below).   
Hypothesis 1H: The mean political slant of news sources in tweets by individuals is 
significantly correlated to the mean political slant of the tweets that they receive from 
their followees.  
 
For notational convenience, we group differing hypotheses about the same variables under the 
same hypothesis number, but append letters to indicate which theories they correspond to.  For 
instance, Hypothesis 1H describes the homophily hypothesis about the relationship between incoming 
and outgoing slant, while Hypothesis 1EC, Hypothesis 1P, and Hypothesis 1M (below) describe the echo 
chambers hypothesis, polarization hypothesis and mainstreaming hypothesis, respectively. We continue to 
use “H” for homophily, “EC” for echo chambers, “P” for polarization, and “M” for mainstreaming 
throughout. 
2.1 Echo Chambers 
For our purposes, what cross-sectional observations would be consistent with echo 
chambers? In an echo chamber, one only hears things one might have said oneself.  If the 
homophily of Hypothesis 1H is strong enough to create echo chambers, we would expect not just 
correlation between political slants, but indeed for people to tweet at the same mean level of 
political slant as those that they follow.   
Hypothesis 1EC: The mean political slant of news sources in tweets sent by individuals is 
the same as the mean political slant of the tweets that they receive from the people they 
follow.  
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In addition to mean outgoing slant being the same as mean incoming political slant, a 
meaningful echo chamber would lack diversity in information, in which people send and receive 
information from only a narrow range of viewpoints.  This lack of diversity drives conformity 
with a slanted perspective.  By the same logic, an individual who receives diverse information 
would tweet in a more politically balanced way: 
Hypothesis 2EC: The larger the standard deviation of political slant an account receives, 
the closer mean outgoing slant will be to the political center  
   
The imagery of “echo chambers” further suggests a closed social network neighborhood, 
in which ideas reverberate among people who know each other but who are disconnected from 
the outside world.  Network theory supports the notion that people in highly clustered positions 
in the social network are likely to be similar with respect to political slant:  individuals in such 
dense clusters accrue shared, mutual knowledge as a consequence of communicating with each 
other (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 1999; Burt, 2004).  Moreover, beliefs and social behaviors 
spread by the process of ‘complex contagion,’ (Centola, 2010) in which the ‘infectiousness’ of a 
behavior increases with repeated exposures and thus tend to spread within rather than between 
clusters of ties (see also Romero, Meeder and Kleinberg, 2011 for evidence on political speech 
on Twitter consistent with the theory of complex contagions). As a result, we would expect 
people within dense clusters to be more politically similar to each other than people who are not 
in highly clustered network positions.  
Hypothesis 3EC: The greater the clustering around an individual, the closer the political 
slant in their own tweets is to the political slant in the tweets they receive from the people 
they follow.  
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2.2 Polarization 
Sunstein (2002, 2008) argues that when like-minded individuals are connected, the views 
they express can be more extreme than what they would have expressed prior to deliberation, in 
part because of social pressure toward conformity. He refers to this phenomenon as polarization. 
Conover et al. (2011) document polarization as a phenomenon in which the two sides are not 
ignorant of each other (as the simple echo chambers theory would have it) but rather in conflict: 
although people do not retweet information from users on the other side of the political spectrum, 
they are aware of them and what they are saying.  In this view of polarization (that we adopt 
here), people read at least some information from both sides of the political spectrum, but only 
tweet out information consistent with their own side. If Twitter accounts are not just 
homophilous but also polarized, it would suggest that they tweet at more extreme levels of slant 
than the average slant of information they receive in their news feeds (which, because it contains 
at least some information from the other side of the spectrum is closer to the political center than 
the slant of the information consumed from their own side of the spectrum).   
Hypothesis 1P: The mean political slant of news sources in tweets by individuals is more 
extreme than the mean political slant of the tweets that they receive from the people they 
follow.  
 
If exposure to opposing viewpoints brings polarization, then indeed this theory makes a 
different prediction from that of Hypothesis 2EC with respect to the diversity of incoming ideas: 
Hypothesis 2P: The larger the standard deviation of political slant an account receives, 
the more extreme outgoing slant is relative to incoming slant. 
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2.3 Mainstreaming Theory 
Finally, we turn to hypotheses implied by mainstreaming.  The component theories that 
make up our “mainstreaming” theory (especially context collapse and the spiral of silence) do 
not explicitly make predictions about the choices individuals make about what information to 
consume – only the information they choose to put into the public domain themselves.  A very 
strong hypothesis that takes the original idea of a spiral of silence very literally is that whatever 
they read, we would find people tweeting only politically centrist content themselves. 
However, to successfully tweet at the true political center, people would have to know 
where the political center was.  This may not be realistic.  Instead, people’s understanding of 
which opinions are centrist may be biased toward the information they are exposed to (e.g. 
democrats will think the center is further left than republicans will).  Indeed, it has been shown 
that centrist content is often perceived as biased against one’s own side (Vallone, Ross and 
Lepper, 1985).  Therefore, a more behaviorally realistic version of the mainstreaming hypothesis 
is that we would expect individuals to Tweet material that is more politically neutral (centrist) 
than what they receive, even if it is not at the true political center. 
Hypothesis 1M: The mean political slant of news sources linked to in an individual’s own 
tweets is more politically centrist than the mean political slant in the tweets they receive 
from the people they follow.  
 
 
2.4 Beyond average behavior: macroscopic and subnetwork analyses 
The above hypotheses are specified in microscopic terms, —in that we treat individuals 
as the units of analysis—and will be tested on the entirety of link-posting behavior on Twitter 
during the study period. These hypothesis tests serve our theoretical questions and provide the 
foundation of our empirical analysis.  
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To paint a fuller picture, however, and to better connect our work with prior research on 
social media, we also include a series of analyses that take other perspectives on the data.  In 
particular, scholars of online communities have been concerned with their macroscopic core-
periphery structure (Dahlander and Fredriksen, 2012; Collier and Kraut, 2012; Wasko, Teigland 
and Faraj, 2009), which Wu, et al. (2011) have demonstrated also describes Twitter networks. In 
a classic core-periphery structure, the network core is a set of nodes (individuals) that tend to be 
connected to each other; the periphery is a (typically larger) set of nodes that tend to be 
connected to nodes in the core, but not to each other (Borgatti and Everett, 1999).   In the setting 
of Twitter, this is to say that there is a set of highly-followed accounts (the core) that tend to 
follow each other; more typical users (the periphery) follow members of the core, but are less 
likely to follow other typical users. 
2.4.1 Analyses of macroscopic structure 
Members of the news-sharing core differ from other users with respect to their network 
position; it is possible that they also differ from other users in terms of the correlation between 
incoming slant and outgoing slant.  To check for this possibility, we repeat a basic analysis of the 
relationship between incoming and outgoing slant on two subgraphs3 of the Twitter news-sharing 
network.  In particular, we distinguish those accounts that are highly followed and active in 
posting many links to news items from those that are not.   
We expect to find a higher correlation between incoming and outgoing slant in the ‘news-
centric core’—the subgraph of individuals who are both highly followed and post many news 
items—than in subgraphs comprising individuals who are not highly followed or do not post 
                                                     
3 A subgraph consists of a certain subset of nodes of a larger network, along with all of the links between 
them.     
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many news items or both. People in the news-centric core may be maintaining a public identity 
centered around news, and so may connect with fewer people for reasons other than discussion 
of news.  They may also engage in self-conscious management (Marwick and boyd, 2010) of 
their list of followees -- to demonstrate party loyalty, for example -- which would result in a 
higher correlation between incoming and outgoing slant.   
In contrast to members of the news-centric core, those who are highly followed but do 
not post many links to news items are probably highly followed for other reasons, such as 
celebrity, and may not pay as much attention to the variable of political slant when choosing 
whom to follow.  Those who post many links to news items but are not highly followed may well 
demonstrate homophily on political slant, but because they are less likely to be public figures, 
they may not be curating their followee list as self-consciously as members of the news-centric 
core.  Finally those who are neither highly followed (among the individuals in our data 
comprising people who posted hyperlinks and their followers and followees) nor highly active 
posters of news may be less active users of Twitter, or actively using Twitter for other purposes, 
and thus are expected to demonstrate less homophily on political slant than those in the news-
centric core. 
Hypothesis 4H: The mean political slant of news sources in tweets sent by individuals in 
the news-centric core of Twitter users is closer to the mean political slant of the tweets 
that they receive from their followees than for people outside of the news-centric core. 
 
Following the logic above and Wu, et al.’s (2011) observation that ‘coreness’ is not a 
binary but rather a continuous variable, we would expect that the higher the thresholds we use to 
separate individuals who are “highly followed” and “post many links to news” from everybody 
else (i.e. the stricter the definition of what constitutions the news-centric core), the more 
homophilous members of the core would be. Moreover, prior work (Conover, et al., 2011) has 
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found not just homophily but indeed polarization when focusing on accounts in what we argue is 
likely to be the network core.   
Hypothesis 4P: The stricter the definition of what constitutes the news-centric core, the 
more extreme outgoing slant is, relative to incoming slant. 
 
2.4.2 Correspondence of macroscopic network structure and political slant  
Earlier studies of political division on social media have shown a clear correspondence 
between the macroscopic structure of a network and the political slant of its nodes (Adamic and 
Glance, 2005; Conover et al, 2011).  In particular, this work shows that the network is starkly 
divided into two (one liberal and one conservative) modular clusters of nodes, such that nodes 
tend to be connected within each cluster, but only sparsely connected between clusters.  By 
showing how cleanly political slant corresponds to network structure, these excellent studies lend 
strong support to the cyber-balkanization theory (Adamic and Glance, 2005) and polarization 
theory (Conover et al., 2011), discussed above. 
These studies are nevertheless limited in two important ways.  First, both studies use only 
a binary, liberal v. conservative representation of slant, preventing more nuanced examination of 
homophily. Second, both studies only consider the behavior of elites and self-identified partisans 
(i.e. members of the news-centric core, whom we have just argued are not representative of the 
typical user) and thus shed no light on how social media works as a platform for discourse for the 
vast majority of users.  
Because our data includes a continuous representation of political slant and includes all 
Twitter users rather than only elites, we are able to address these two limitations. First, we are 
able to analyze the core separately from other users.  Second, rather than considering 
15 
 
classifications of nodes into two categories (liberal v. conservative), we focus instead on 
permutations of nodes defined either by political slant or other means.  
A permutation is simply an ordering of the nodes of a network such that each node is 
assigned an ordinal number from 1 to N (where N is the number of nodes in the network). 
Permutations can be defined by any number of means, but in the present context we will be 
particularly interested in permutations derived from the political slant variables: those in which 
the nodes are ordered from most liberal (and thus given the number 1) to the most conservative 
(and thus given the number N). A “good” permutation is one in which nodes that are close 
together in the network are close together in the ordering of nodes.   
The echo chambers and polarization theories have been associated with a close 
correspondence between network structure and political slant, while the mainstreaming theory 
predicts the opposite.  In the following hypotheses (labeled 5Ma – 5Md, with an “M” to indicate 
that they express the mainstreaming point of view, and “a”, “b”, “c” or “d” to identify a specific 
detailed hypotheses), we compare the quality of permutations in this sense.  Section 3.4.3, below, 
provides more concrete details on measurement of permutation quality.   
Essentially, just as prior  work (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover et al, 2011) showed 
that classifying nodes into liberal v. conservative was a good fit to the macroscopic division of 
the network into two distinct communities, we will ask if a continuous measure of political slant 
is a good one-dimensional description of network structure. We wish to ask this question for both 
incoming and outgoing slant and for the network core and network periphery. To establish 
whether permutations based on incoming or outgoing slant are “good” descriptions of 
macroscopic network structure, we will compare them to permutations derived from standard 
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community discovery algorithms (see methods, below); we repeat this process separately for the 
core and the periphery. 
Accordingly, we test the following hypotheses about the quality of nodal permutations 
for the core. 
Hypothesis 5Ma: Outgoing political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network core. 
Hypothesis 5Mb: Incoming political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network core. 
 
We go on to test the following hypotheses about the quality of nodal permutations for the 
periphery. 
Hypothesis 5Mc: Outgoing political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network periphery. 
Hypothesis 5Md: Incoming political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network periphery. 
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS  
Our primary analysis is based on relatively old (from 2009), but exceptionally complete 
data that is described here. Additionally, to provide robustness checks, we conducted similar 
analyses on sampled data from early 2017.  Data, methods and results of these robustness checks 
are presented in Appendix A.  
3.1 The Twitter Dataset 
Our Twitter data for our primary analysis comes from Galuba et al. (2010). For 300 
continuous hours, starting on Thursday, September 10th, 2009, 19:56:47 GMT, the Twitter 
Search API was continuously queried for the search string “http”. The text of each tweet returned 
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by the query was parsed for any URLs and user names it contained. Each URL mentioned in the 
tweets was stored. If the URL was created by one of the popular URL shortening services (e.g. 
bit.ly), HTTP redirects were recursively followed to expand the URL to its original form. All the 
URLs were also URL-decoded to ensure uniform representation under the percent-encoding 
(%xx) notation. For each tweet, the Twitter API was queried for the metadata about the tweet’s 
author as well as all the users that the author follows. 
 
3.2 Measurement of Political Slant 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) published measurements of the political slant of the 119 
most widely visited sources of online news in the United States, building on data from comScore 
Plan Metrix with 12 months data in 2009 (the same year as the Twitter data). Plan Metrix data 
come from a survey distributed electronically to approximately 12,000 comScore panelists. The 
survey asks panelists the question “In terms of your political outlook, do you think of yourself 
as. . .? [very conservative / somewhat conservative/ middle-of-the-road/ somewhat liberal / very 
liberal]”. The average number of daily unique visitors in each category is reported by comScore 
for each site for each month.  
Using this data, they posit the model of utility of a visit to a website in equation 1. The 
utility is that of user i going to site j on visit k on a given day, given the site quality α, political 
slant γ, and dummy variable c set to 1 if visitor i is conservative and 0 if they are liberal (they 
omit data from individuals who answered “middle of the road”). 
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼𝑗 + (2𝑐𝑖 − 1)𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘                                                                                                     (1)          
 
They estimate these parameters from the visit data, under the discrete choice modeling 
assumption that the visit would be made if and only if uijk ≥ uirk ∀r ≠ j.  We use the estimated 
18 
 
parameter γ as our measure of political slant.  We also use α as a control variable indicating site 
quality. For the analysis, we use all tweets that contain any of the 119 domain URLs from 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011)4.   
Although Plan Metrix data are only available for relatively large sites, visits to news sites 
are highly concentrated. The 119 sites in the sample represent over 95% of all visits to news sites 
via independent browsing online (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011), and given the greater expected 
concentration of exposure on social media than independent browsing (i.e. finding news stories 
through other means, such as direct access of sites, search engines, or news aggregators) (Hong, 
2012), the sample is expected to be even more completely representative for the setting of 
Twitter.   
Because the data set for our primary analysis is relatively old, we also conducted a 
robustness check on 2017 data.   This required us to calculate updated measurements of political 
slant and devise an approach to constructing an informative, if much smaller, sample of Twitter 
accounts. These methods, along with results for robustness checks are reported in Appendix A.  
 
3.3 Variables 
For each user, we calculated mean and standard deviation of incoming political slant 
(incoming slant) and mean and standard deviation of outgoing source slant (outgoing slant). The 
distribution of an individual account’s outgoing slant comprises the political slant of each URL 
source that the user tweeted. The distribution of incoming slant comprises the slant score of 
every URL tweeted by the individuals whom that user follows (his/her followees). For both 
incoming and outgoing slant, if a news source was tweeted more than once, its slant score would 
                                                     
4 for further detail on Genztkow and Shapiro’s methods, see their online appendix: 
http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/echo_modelappdx.pdf 
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be counted more than once in the distribution. Similarly, we calculate mean incoming (outgoing) 
quality for each individual from Gentzkow and Shapiro’s α. Finally we tabulate the count 
(number) of incoming and outgoing tweets for each user.  Note that we fit models on data for 
users that both sent and received tweets containing links to news sources; to calculate incoming 
slant, however, we consider tweets from all users, including those who did not receive any news 
links in their own timelines.  The output of those Twitter users who are widely followed but do 
not follow other accounts (typically public figures) is therefore still accounted for in the data. 
Using the Twitter data, we construct a follower-followee network.  A directed network tie 
exists from user i to user j if user j is a follower of user i. From this data, we calculated the 
clustering coefficient, (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), which captures the degree to which one’s 
followers and followees also follow each other.  More specifically, it is a measure of how many 
links there are among a node’s neighbors, divided by the number of links that could exist among 
a node’s neighbors5.  
3.4 Statistical Models 
3.4.1 Average behavior 
We fit ordinary least squares (OLS) models to test all versions of Hypotheses 1-3.   For 
the variants of Hypothesis 1, the primary independent variable is incoming slant. Hypotheses 2 
and 3 concern how one variable affects the relationship between incoming and outgoing slant.  
Thus, for variants of Hypothesis 2, we are interested in the interaction between the standard 
                                                     
5 Let A denote the adjacency matrix of a network, such that Aij = 1 when there is a tie from node i to node j. Further, 
let nei(i) = {j: Aij =1 ∨ Aji = 1} denote the set of vertices that are neighbors of node i, and gi =|nei(i)| denote the 
number of neighbors of node i.  Then the clustering coefficient of node i, Ci is defined as follows. 
 
𝐶𝑖 = 
∑ ∑ 𝑨𝒋𝑘 = 1,𝑘𝑗  𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑛𝑒𝑖(𝑖)
(𝑔𝑖)(𝑔𝑖 − 1)
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deviation of incoming slant and the main effect6 of incoming slant.  For Hypothesis 3EC, we are 
interested in the interaction between clustering coefficient and the main effect of incoming slant. 
3.4.2 Core-Periphery structure 
Hypotheses 4H and 4P concern the difference between the behavior of people who are 
highly followed and post many news articles and other individuals.  To test these, we select 
nodes that are greater than or equal to some threshold quantiles, s and t, of outdegree and number 
of news stories posted, for s, t ∈ {0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.95}. We then consider the induced subgraph 
containing only those nodes that have outdegree greater than s% of nodes and have posted more 
news stories than t% of nodes in the full network.  We then regress outgoing slant (dependent 
variable) on incoming slant (explanatory variable) for only those tweets coming from within this 
subgraph and separately, for all tweets coming from any source using OLS.  
 
Figure 1: An illustration of two different permutations of the same matrix.  Left: a good 
permutation that places connected nodes close together in the permutation and as a result 
concentrates ties toward the diagonal of the matrix.  Right: a bad permutation, in which nodes 
that are connected in the network are not close in the permutation; as a result, tie weight is not 
concentrated toward the diagonal.  
                                                     
6 NB: here and below “effect” is intended only in the sense of “statistical effect” and not in the sense of  
“causal effect.” 
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3.4.3 Concordance of community structure and slant 
Hypotheses 5Ma-5Md concern the concordance between the macroscopic community 
structure of the network and the political slant of the nodes.  For these hypotheses, we are asking 
if permutations based on slant are good in the sense that nodes that are closely connected in the 
network are also close together in the permutation ordering (see Figure 1 for a toy example).   
However, it is unclear a priori how to measure such correspondence between slant and 
structure, and then, how to determine if a given level of correspondence between slant and 
structure is a lot of correspondence or only a little.  In other words, how good is good? In order 
to test these hypotheses, we therefore (1) define a measure of permutation quality (2) use 
standard community-discovery algorithms from the literature to define permutations that 
represent network structure well and measure their quality, (3) measure the quality of 
permutations based on slant, and (4) define a significance test to determine if the quality of the 
slant-based permutations are significantly worse than the community-discovery algorithmic 
permutations. 
 Hypotheses 5Ma, and 5Mb concern the news-centric core, and Hypotheses 5Mc and 
5Md concern those outside of the news-centric core.  The “core” subgraph is defined as above, 
using nodes greater than or equal to some quantiles s, t of outdegree and news posting activity 
such that a regression of outgoing slant on incoming slant yields the highest estimated parameter. 
Because of the computational expense of conducting these analyses on all ~213,000 nodes 
outside of the news-centric core using our methods, we test the latter hypotheses on a subgraph 
consisting only of moderate users.  We define this subgraph as giant component of those 
accounts between the 25th and 75th percentiles for outdegree and less than the 75th percentile for 
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number of news items posted.  This results in a subgraph of 75,640 Twitter accounts (a little 
more than one third of all news-active accounts), which omits the large number of least active 
and least followed accounts.    
To measure quality of permutations, we start with the intuitions that connected nodes 
(those that follow each other) should be close together in a “good” permutation and that ties 
(matrix entries equal to 1) between nodes whose indices are close together in a given 
permutation will be close to the diagonal of the permuted adjacency matrix. Conversely, of 
course, ties between nodes that are far apart in the permutation will be far from the diagonal in 
the permuted adjacency matrix.  We use these intuitions to define an idealized model against 
which to compare the observed permuted data such that we can evaluate them quantitatively. 
 We define the idealized model as a probability matrix, Z, such that matrix entries 
(network ties) closest to the diagonal are modeled as having probability 1, with linearly declining 
probability further from the diagonal.  Note that this is not a fitted model, so the “probabilities” 
are not estimated from the data; as an idealized model, the matrix of probabilities functions more 
as a “scoring matrix:” we calculate the likelihood of the idealized model, Z, under the observed 
permuted data in question.  
Concretely,  
Zi,j = 0 (No self loops) 
Zi,j = 1 ,   j ∈ {i+1, i-1} (Highest probability closest to diagonal) 
Zi,j = Zi,j-1 – 1/n ,  j ≥ i+2  
(Decreasing probability with distance from diagonal) 
Zi,j = Zi,j+1 – 1/n ,  j ≤ i-2  
where i and j are row and column indices, respectively, and n is the number of nodes. In general, 
a log likelihood is calculated by summing the log probabilities of the data points, conditional on 
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the model.    A matrix of probabilities of ties existing where they do in the permuted matrix P, 
conditional on Z can be obtained by simply taking the Hadamard (pointwise) product of Z and P. 
To calculate the log likelihood ℓp of Z under some permutated adjacency matrix, P, we then 
simply sum the log of the values in the resulting product matrix:   
ℓ𝑝 = ∑ ln (𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑗)𝑖𝑗                                                                                                      (2)  
The higher the log likelihood, the more closely the permuted observed matrix adheres to the 
idealized model, Z.   
In addition to the permutations implicit in sorting the nodes according to their outgoing 
and incoming slants, we also consider two algorithmically-defined permutations deriving from 
the network structure (pattern of follower/followee ties) alone, rather than taking into account 
political slant or any other nodal attribute.  Algorithmically defined permutations attempt to 
place nodes close together in the permutation ordering if they are close together in the network.  
In the first of these, we follow the usual procedure of spectral clustering: we calculate the 
eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix (a transformation of the adjacency matrix representation of 
the network) and then rank nodes according to the values in the eigenvector corresponding to one 
of the smallest eigenvalues not equal to zero7 (see e.g. (Dhillon, 2001; Von Luxburg, 2007) for 
more detail).  To find the smallest eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors of the “moderate 
user” subgraph, we use ARPACK numerical methods (Lehoucq, Sorensen, and Yang, 1998), 
which are therefore approximate.  In the second algorithmically-defined permutation, we use the 
method of Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004), as implemented in the igraph analytical software 
package (Csardi and Nepusz, 2006), which produces a full hierarchical dendrogram as a side 
                                                     
7 Usually the best description of the macroscopic structure of a network is found in values of the eigenvector 
corresponding to the smallest non-zero eigenvalue, but not always.  We therefore consider the eigenvectors 
corresponding to the 5 smallest eigenvalues and take the best, where best is defined as yielding the highest 
likelihood of Z (see below). 
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effect of finding a smaller number of communities. We simply take the ordering of nodes at the 
bottom level of that dendrogram as our permutation.8  
We visualize the difference between these four permutations of nodes (two by slant and 
two by community discovery algorithm) by plotting the adjacency matrix, with the rows and 
columns in permutation order for the core and moderate users subgraphs (Figures 2 and 3).  On 
these plots, if rows are indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {1…𝑁}, and columns are indexed by 𝑗 ∈ {1…𝑁}, then a 
point at location (i,j) on the visualization indicates that there exists a tie between node i and node 
j (account j follows account i on Twitter).  The closer a permutation is to the idealized model, Z, 
the more the points in these plots will be concentrated toward the matrix diagonal.   
It remains to be determined how much higher a log likelihood has to be to be considered 
significantly better than the likelihood of an alternative permutation of the observed matrix. 
Typically, likelihoods are compared via likelihood ratio tests.  Strictly speaking, however, 
likelihoods calculated from a matrix probability model on two different permutations of the same 
data are not from nested models, and thus the chi-squared limiting distribution on the traditional 
likelihood ratio test cannot be assumed. Instead, we calculate a critical value for distinguishing 
between the likelihoods of this model under these two permutations computationally.   
We calculate the worst-case reduction of log likelihood due to incorrect ordering for each 
of 5% of the total number of nodes and tabulate the reduction of log likelihood that would occur 
if the edges incident to those nodes were moved as far away from the diagonal as possible.  We 
repeat this procedure 1000 times and take the 95% percentile of the resulting distribution to be 
                                                     
8 We grant that this permutation is based on a partial, rather than full ordering of nodes, since the first pair of nodes 
that are grouped together in a given branch of the dendrogram could appear in either order in the final permutation.  
However, since the number of such interchangeable pairs is small, and the distance that each node in these pairs 
could move in the permutation is at maximum 1 spot, we take the partial ordering output from the R function to be 
representative of the quality of all such possible permutations.  
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the critical value.  If the log likelihood of an alternative permutation is less than this critical 
value, we would consider that alternative permutation to be a worse description of network 
structure.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The adjacency matrix of the news-centric core, permuted by outgoing slant (top left) 
by incoming slant (top right) by the method of Clauset, Newman and Moore (2004) (bottom left) 
and by the values of the eigenvector corresponding to one of the smallest eigenvalues of the 
Laplacian matrix (bottom right).  
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Figure 3: The adjacency matrix of the “moderate users” subgraph taken from the periphery, 
permuted by outgoing slant (top left) by incoming slant (top right) by the method of Clauset, 
Newman and Moore (2004) (bottom left) and by the values of the eigenvector corresponding to 
one of the smallest eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix (bottom right).  
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3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
In our dataset, after processing and selecting those who both received and sent tweets 
containing links to the sources we covered, we were left with a group of 215,174 Twitter 
accounts that posted 908,565 tweets containing a hyperlink to one of the 119 news sources for 
which Gentzkow and Shapiro provide an estimated political slant.  There were 14,870,199 
follower-followee relationships among these accounts, and only 6709 accounts did not follow 
and were not followed by any of the other accounts that posted links to the 119 domains. 
There were 165,624 accounts that had outgoing slant less than zero (liberal) and 49,550 
accounts that had outgoing slant greater than zero (conservative). This is consistent with Pew’s 
survey results, which indicate that liberals were significantly more active on social media at that 
time (Pew Research Center, 2012). Descriptive statistics are in Table 1 and correlations are in 
Table 2.  We also tabulated the counts of users by mean incoming slant and mean outgoing slant. 
As Table 3 shows, we find that some people read tweets from the opposite side of the political 
spectrum from the side they tweet on themselves. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Min Median Mean  Max Sd 
Mean outgoing slant -1.5568 -0.251 -0.233 2.263 0.393 
Count of outgoing tweets 1 1 4.156 3321 22.495 
Quality of outgoing tweets 0 5.970 5.802 8.630 1.251 
Mean incoming slant -1.557 -0.233 -.226 1.879 0.232 
Count of incoming tweets 0 147 715.8 100984 2238.6 
Quality of incoming tweets 0 5.878 5.847 8.630 0.768 
Standard Dev. of incoming slant 0 0.335 0.321 1.687 0.139 
Count of outgoing retweets 0 0 0.7631 867 3.96 
Outdegree 0 11 70.77 52731 348.7 
Indegree  0 17 71.33 32511 252.66 
Clustering Coefficient 0 0.081 0.108 1 0.116 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
Mean 
outgoing 
Slant 
Count of 
outgoing 
tweets 
Quality of 
outgoing 
tweets 
Mean 
incoming 
Slant 
Count of 
incoming 
tweets 
Quality of 
incoming 
tweets 
Outdegree indegree 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
Count of 
retweets 
ln(outdegree+2)/ 
ln(indegree+2) 
outSlant 1 0.017 -0.1342 0.395 0.063 -0.087 0.025 0.0352 0.0163 0.0315 0.0276 
outCount 0.017 1 -0.005 0.034 0.086 -0.015 0.0554 0.0463 -0.0419 0.2044 0.1243 
outQuality -0.134 -0.005 1 -0.084 -0.023 0.243 -0.0095 -0.0154 -0.0084 -0.0221 -0.0167 
inSlant 0.395 0.034 -0.0836 1 0.09 -0.216 0.0413 0.0586 0.0351 0.0423 0.0278 
inCount 0.063 0.086 -0.023 0.09 1 -0.033 0.6449 0.8956 -0.1116 0.0893 -0.0269 
inQual -0.087 -0.015 0.243 -0.216 -0.033 1 -0.021 -0.0345 0.033 -0.0256 -0.0818 
outdegree 0.025 0.055 -0.0095 0.041 0.645 -0.021 1 0.7685 -0.0992 0.0413 0.0943 
indegree 0.035 0.046 -0.0154 0.059 0.896 -0.035 0.7685 1 -0.1125 0.0537 -0.0074 
Clustering Coef 0.016 -0.042 -0.0084 0.035 -0.112 0.033 -0.0992 -0.1125 1 -0.0159 -0.1747 
rtCount 0.031 0.204 -0.0221 0.042 0.089 -0.026 0.0413 0.0537 -0.0159 1 -0.0011 
ln(OD+2)/ 
ln(ID+2) 
0.028 0.124 -0.0167 0.028 -0.027 -0.082 0.0943 -0.0074 -0.1747 -0.0011 1 
 
 
Table 3: Tabulation of mean incoming and outgoing political slant by account 
 
Mean incoming slant 
Mean out. slant (-1.75,-1.25] (-1.25,-0.75] (-0.75,-0.25] (-0.25,0.25] (0.25,0.75] (0.75,1.25] (1.25,1.75] 
(1.75,2.25] 0 0 9 38 18 2 0 
(1.25,1.75] 0 2 29 100 71 6 0 
(0.75,1.25] 0 25 1073 2847 1153 100 3 
(0.25,0.75] 1 112 4959 11640 3335 123 4 
(-0.25,0.25] 6 536 27949 47400 2432 125 7 
(-0.75,-0.25] 4 519 43881 34305 973 67 1 
(-1.25,-0.75] 2 1840 14856 7241 281 19 0 
(-1.75,-1.25] 0 3 222 122 1 0 0 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Average behavior 
We begin with results for average behavior of all individuals who tweeted a link to one of 
the sites covered by the Genztkow and Shapiro data.  We report regression coefficients from 
OLS models in Table 4. To ease interpretability with respect to the main variables of interest 
(incoming and outgoing slant), all other variables are centered at their mean and scaled to unit 
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variance.  Additionally, all covariates are included both as main effects and as interaction effects 
with incoming slant.   
Most notably, the estimated parameter for the mean political slant of sites linked-to in 
incoming tweets ranged from 0.667 to 0.724, significantly less than 1.  Robustness checks with 
recent data (see Appendix A) are in agreement with the full analysis presented here; parameter 
estimates from 2017 data were 0.586 and 0.751.  Additional statistical results are mentioned in 
line with the text, below. 
 Hypothesis 1H stipulates that there is a significant correlation between the political slant 
in incoming versus outgoing tweets.  As just mentioned above, we estimated a positive and 
significant regression parameter for this relationship across all models.  We do find homophily, 
and the null hypothesis is therefore rejected. 
4.1.1 Echo Chambers 
Hypothesis 1EC makes a stronger statement than Hypothesis 1H about the relationship 
between incoming and outgoing slant, positing that they are equal.  If Hypothesis 1EC were true, 
we would expect the regression parameter to be equal to 1.0 (meaning the outgoing slant is equal 
to 1.0 times the incoming slant, and therefore equal).  Given the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients, we fail to reject a composite null hypothesis of correlation but not equality: the 
outgoing slant is not equal to the incoming slant.  The slant at which people tweet is correlated 
with but not equal to the slant of the material they receive.   
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Table 4 Relationship between incoming and outgoing political slant 
 DV: Mean slant of sites in outgoing tweets 
 I II III IV 
Mean slant, sites in  incoming tweets 0.667 *** 0.697 *** 0.720 *** 0.724 *** 
0.003  0.004  0.004  0.004  
ln(Count of incoming tweets)   0.036 *** 0.032 *** 0.029 *** 
  0.001  0.002  0.004  
ln(Count of outgoing tweets)    0.010 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 
  0.010  0.001  0.001  
Mean quality of sites in incoming tweets   0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 
  0.001  0.001  0.001  
Std deviation of slant of incoming tweets   0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 
  0.001  0.001  0.001  
ln(# followers+2)     0.013 *** 0.018 *** 
    0.002  0..002  
ln(# followers+2) ÷ ln(#followees+2)†     0.007 *** 0.007 *** 
    0.001  0.002  
Clustering coefficient       0.012 *** 
      0.001  
Incoming slant x  ln(Count incoming 
tweets) 
  0.086 *** 0.018 *** -0.004 
  0.004  0.005  0.005  
Incoming slant x  ln(Count outgoing tweets)    0.044 *** 0.040 *** 0.042 *** 
  0.003  0.003  0.003  
Incoming slant x  quality of incoming tweets   0.023 *** 0.020 *** 0.022 *** 
  0.003  0.003  0.003  
Incoming slant x  st. dev. of incoming slant   0.086 *** 0.066 *** 0.062 *** 
  0.003  0.003  0.003  
Incoming slant x  ln(# followers+2)     0.133 *** 0.156 *** 
    0.007  0.008  
Inc. slant x ln(#followers+2) ÷ 
ln(#followees+2)† 
    -0.058 *** -0.068 *** 
    0.004  0.004  
Incoming slant x  Clustering coefficient       0.030 *** 
      0.003  
Intercept -0.083 *** -0.084 *** -0.078 *** -0.078 *** 
0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001  
# of Twitter accounts  208465  208465  208465  204464  
Adjusted R2 0.156  0.171 0 0.173  0.177  
Notes:  standard errors are printed below parameter estimates. 
***: p< 0.001; **: p< 0.01;  *: p < 0.05 
Except for mean incoming slant and mean outgoing slant, all variables are centered and scaled 
to unit variance 
† the logarithm of the number of followers/ees plus 2 is taken to avoid dividing by zero for those 
with no followees. 
31 
 
Hypothesis 2EC concerns the relationship between the diversity of news consumed and 
the effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant.  The theory of echo chambers implies that less 
diversity should result in more conformity; in other words, given the fact that the estimated 
parameter for the main effect of incoming slant is less than one, we should expect a negative sign 
on the estimated parameter for the interaction between the standard deviation of incoming slant 
with the mean incoming slant, such that less diversity results in an outgoing slant closer to 
incoming slant.  Contrary to the prediction of hypothesis 2EC, we do not see this; in fact, we see 
a positive and significant parameter estimate. We continue our discussion of this parameter 
estimate with respect to hypothesis 2P, below. 
Hypothesis 3EC speaks to the notion that clustering is associated with “echo chambers” 
in social media.  It is intended to represent the notion that people in clustered positions (those 
whose followers and followees also follow each other), may be even more likely than those in 
unclustered positions to tweet at a similar political slant to their network neighbors.  Table 4, 
model IV reports a regression coefficient of 0.030 for the interaction between clustering and 
incoming slant.  Therefore we reject the null for Hypothesis 3EC, as we do find evidence that 
people in positions of high clustering tweet more similarly to the people they follow than people 
in positions of low clustering.  However, we must note that the effect of clustering, while 
statistically significant, is only of modest magnitude.  A one-standard deviation increase in 
clustering coefficient would only result in a predicted increase in outgoing slant from 0.724 
times the incoming slant to 0.754 times the incoming slant. 
Finally, it should be noted that the models in Table 4 all have low R2.  Incoming slant 
predicts outgoing slant, but only with a lot of error.  This large error is itself a sort of evidence 
against the idea of widespread echo chambers.  If the mean difference between outgoing slant 
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and incoming slant is substantial, as we see for the whole population, then clearly people are not 
only being exposed to views they would have tweeted themselves. 
 
4.1.2 Polarization  
The theory of polarization says that the average incoming slant should be more centrist 
than average outgoing slant, because people receive some information (that they disagree with) 
from the other side of the political spectrum. Thus, Hypothesis 1P says that the estimated 
parameter for incoming slant’s effect on outgoing slant should be greater than one.  Since the 
parameter in our models is at most approximately 0.72 (0.75 for 2017 data) we fail to reject the 
null for Hypothesis 1P for the whole population.   
Although the main effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant is less than one, the 
parameter estimate for the interaction between the standard deviation of incoming slant and 
mean of incoming slant is positive and significant: the greater the exposure to diverse views, the 
more extreme outgoing slant is relative to incoming slant.  Thus we reject the null for Hypothesis 
2P.  Although the population as a whole does not show evidence of polarization, this result 
suggests that there is some heterogeneity, and those that are exposed to more diverse viewpoints 
could be seen as more polarized by this measure. People exposed to a narrow range of slant tend 
on average to post more moderately than what they read, but the wider the range of slant that a 
user is exposed to, the less moderate they are. Our analysis of the network core, below, returns to 
this issue. 
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4.1.3 Mainstreaming 
Hypothesis 1M considers the relationship between incoming and outgoing political slant 
from the perspective of mainstreaming theory. Although a strong version of the theory would say 
that the average Twitter user tweets at the same level of slant as the mean of the whole 
population, our Hypothesis 1M recognizes that people do not necessarily know where true 
political center is and says only that people tend to tweet more centrist material than the material 
they read in their own newsfeeds.  As already stated, the estimated coefficient from Table 4 
ranged from 0.67 to 0.72 (or 0.59 and .75 on models fit on 2017 data – see Appendix A), 
statistically significantly less than 1, and greater than 0.  In other words, we reject the null for 
hypothesis 1M.  Overall, Twitter accounts do tend to tweet more centrist material than the 
material posted by the accounts they follow, but not necessarily at or near the political mean of 
the population. As we explore below, however, there is heterogeneity in this population, and the 
average does not tell the whole story. 
 
4.2 Beyond average behavior: macroscopic and subnetwork analyses 
4.2.1 Core-periphery structure 
Hypotheses 4H and 4P concern a core of highly followed users who are active in posting 
links to news stories.  Hypothesis 4H predicts a larger estimated parameter for the effect of 
incoming slant on outgoing slant within the core (as compared to the periphery), and hypothesis 
4P states that the higher the standards used to define the core, the higher that parameter will be. 
The parameter for the interaction between outdegree and incoming slant in Table 4 already 
provides suggestive evidence in favor of these hypotheses: the more followers a user has, the 
greater the expected slope of outgoing slant with respect to incoming slant.   
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Tables 5, 6, and 7 summarize more direct evidence relevant to these hypotheses: the 
estimated parameter for the effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant is reported for different 
definitions of the core with respect to both outdegree and news posting activity.  When we 
consider only those tweets from inside the core, the maximum parameter estimate that we find is 
1.086; when we consider all tweets from all sources, we find an even higher parameter: 1.172.   
All specifications we tested for the core yielded a higher parameter for the effect of 
incoming slant on outgoing slant than the one we found in our study of the whole population in 
Table 4.  We confirmed the statistical significance of these comparisons in unreported dummy 
variable regressions (p was within machine precision of zero for all models); we thus reject the 
null for Hypothesis 4H.   
As for Hypothesis 4P, there is a clear pattern evident in Tables 5 through 7: the more 
restrictive the definition of the core, the higher the estimated parameter for the effect of incoming 
slant on outgoing slant.  In both tables, the higher the quantile of degree used as a threshold for 
core membership, the greater the estimated parameter.  The magnitude of the effect of raising the 
quantile threshold of news posting activity is smaller than that for degree and in Table 5 is 
generally highest at the 90th quantile of news posting in each column, except the last column, 
corresponding to the strictest definition of the core.  In this right-most column of both tables, the 
maximum parameter estimate is found when we define the core as consisting only of those 
individuals who are above the 95th percentile for both outdegree and number of news items 
posted.  We therefore reject the null for hypothesis 4P: the stricter the definition of what 
constitutes the news-centric core, the greater is the effect of incoming slant on outgoing slant.   
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Table 5: Estimated parameter for incoming slant in regression of outgoing slant on incoming slant for 
news-centric core, with different definitions of which nodes belong to the core, considering only 
communication within the core 
  Quantile of outdegree 
  75th 80th 85th 90th 95th 
Quantile of 
news 
posting 
95th *0.9522 0.9731 0.9929 1.0099 *1.0863 
90th *0.9630 0.9804 1.0029 1.0281 *1.0802 
85th *0.9500 *0.9689 0.9867 1.0196 *1.0623 
80th *0.9451 *0.9622 0.9789 1.0162 *1.0659 
75th *0.9236 *0.9433 *0.9663 0.9988 *1.0447 
Note: * indicates 95% confidence interval for the mean does not contain 1.0 
 
 
 
Table 6: Estimated parameter for incoming slant in regression of outgoing slant on incoming slant for 
news-centric core, with different definitions of which nodes belong to the core, considering all tweets. 
  Quantile of outdegree 
  75th 80th 85th 90th 95th 
Quantile of 
news 
posting 
95th *1.0362 *1.0594 *1.0878 *1.1078 *1.1723 
90th *1.0294 *1.0452 *1.0714 *1.1016 *1.1477 
85th 1.0072 *1.0284 *1.0505 *1.0874 *1.1270 
80th 0.9944 1.0142 *1.0370 *1.0811 *1.1315 
75th *0.9613 0.9848 1.0093 *1.0573 *1.1093 
Note: * indicates 95% confidence interval for the mean does not contain 1.0 
 
 
Table 7: Number of accounts in news-centric core, with different definitions of which nodes belong to the 
core. 
  Quantile of degree 
  75th 80th 85th 90th 95th 
Quantile of 
news 
posting 
95th 6332 5489 4553 3478 1956 
90th 11003 9427 7708 5705 3157 
85th 15929 13480 10799 7866 4303 
80th 20882 17473 13805 9879 5347 
75th 30435 24973 19392 13513 7034 
 
 
4.2.2 Polarization in the core 
Tables 5 through 7 show that the more restrictive the definition of the network core, the 
higher the parameter estimate for the relationship between incoming slant and outgoing slant.  
For moderately restrictive definitions of the network core (for example, those accounts with 
greater than the 85th percentile of outdegree and 90th percentile of news items posted in Table 5) 
the parameter estimates for incoming slant are not significantly different from 1.0.  We therefore 
would be able to reject the null for Hypothesis 1EC – that the mean political slant of news 
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sources in tweets by individuals is statistically indistinguishable from the mean political slant of 
the tweets that they receive from the people they follow – for the news-centric core thus 
moderately defined.  However, for the most restrictive definitions of the core the average 
outgoing slant is in fact more extreme than the average incoming slant, indicating not so much 
echo chambers, in which we would expect people to be reading and tweeting at the same 
political slant, but rather a tendency to polarization, in which we see people reading more centrist 
material on average than what they tweet themselves.   
What emerges is a more nuanced picture of the whole. The vast majority of Twitter 
accounts that post news items do not post many of them, have a moderate number of followers 
among other news-posting accounts, and tend to post news items from more centrist sources than 
what they read themselves.  On the other hand, a small minority of Twitter accounts constituting 
the network core posts relatively many news items from more politically extreme news sources 
than those in their own news feeds.     
This is not to say that the core only posts material from the political extremes or that the 
periphery only posts centrist material, simply that on average the core posts more extreme 
material and the periphery posts more centrist material than the accounts they follow.  Our results 
also do not support the extrapolation that the centrist tendency of accounts in the periphery is due 
to a tendency of following more extreme accounts in the core. We regressed outgoing slant on 
incoming slant after excluding core accounts and the tweets originating from those accounts (in 
the manner of Table 5, but for the periphery rather than for the core).  After thus removing the 
effects of the core from the periphery, the estimated parameter for incoming slant’s effect on 
outgoing slant was 0.7030, only slightly higher than the estimate for the complete data from 
Table 4, model I. 
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4.2.2 Correspondence of community structure and political slant: core 
Is the Twitter follower network organized according to the political slant of its nodes?  
The theories of echo chambers and polarization would predict yes, while the theory of 
mainstreaming would predict no.  Here we make several comparisons between permutations of 
nodes based on slant to those deriving from the patterns of ties alone using community discovery 
algorithms.  Figures 2 and 3 visualize the adjacency matrices of the core and typical users 
subgraphs according to the community discovery-based and slant-based permutations of the 
nodes.  The following paragraphs quantify these comparisons. 
Section 3.4.3, above, describes the matrix probability model of which we calculate the 
likelihood on the algorithmic and slant partitions. In short, the likelihood of this model is 
calculated by pointwise multiplication of Z (see above) with some permuted adjacency matrix P 
and will be high to the extent that a given permutation concentrates tie weight toward the 
diagonal of a matrix. Critical values for differences in likelihoods were determined 
computationally. 
The likelihoods of the diagonal gradient model under the four permutations of the core 
subgraph are presented in Table 8.  Critical values are also given, which represent the 95th 
percentile of the log likelihood expected when 5% of nodes are removed from their proper place 
in the permutation and placed in a worst-fit location in the permutation. Any log likelihoods 
below a permutation’s critical value can be considered worse descriptions of network structure. 
Strikingly, the outgoing slant permutation is a much poorer fit to the diagonal gradient 
model than any of the other three permutations, and indeed the likelihood of Z given the 
outgoing slant permutation is significantly less than the other three according to our critical 
values, leading us to reject the null for Hypothesis 5Ma. Additionally, for the core, the likelihood 
of the incoming slant permutation is not less than the critical values of the Clauset, Newman and 
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Moore (2004) and Laplacian eigenvector-based permutations.  We fail to reject the null for 
Hypothesis 5Mb and find incoming slant to be an equivalently good description of network 
structure as standard community discovery algorithms.  With evidence in favor of 5Mb but not 
5Ma, our results are partially in accord with prior literature for the core. 
 
4.2.3 Correspondence of community structure and political slant: periphery 
 
The likelihood of the diagonal gradient model under the four permutations of the 
“moderate users” subgraph is presented in Table 9.  Both of the slant permutations are worse 
than the critical value of the log likelihood for both of the community discovery algorithms. We 
therefore reject the null for Hypotheses 5Mc and 5Md: community discovery algorithms produce 
better descriptions of network structure than either incoming or outgoing political slant.  For 
users outside of the core, our results contradict earlier studies:  network structure is not well-
described by the political slant of the users. 
 
Table 8: log likelihood of Z under various permutations of nodes of the core 
 Log likelihood of probability  
model Z 
Critical value to be considered 
worse than this permutation 
Laplacian Eigenvector -43063.8 -55396.7 
Incoming Slant -45213.0 -57810.8 
Clauset, Newman and Moore -45961.4 -58396.4 
Outgoing slant -72539.6  
 
Table 9: likelihood of Z under various permutations of nodes of the moderate users subgraph 
 Log Likelihood of 
probability model Z 
Critical value to be considered 
worse than this permutation 
Clauset, Newman and Moore -27611.6 -50379.4 
Laplacian Eigenvector -35840.4 -55604.4 
Incoming Slant -79691.0 -87822.2 
Outgoing slant -94787.2  
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Table 10: Summary of hypothesis tests by theory  
 
Hypothesis 
number 
Hypothesis text 
Main 
analysis: null 
Hypothesis 
rejected? 
2017 
Robustness 
check: Null 
Hypothesis 
rejected? 
Homophily (H)  
 1H The mean political slant of news sources in tweets by individuals 
is significantly correlated to the mean political slant of the tweets 
that they receive from their followees. 
Yes Yes 
 4H The mean political slant of news sources in tweets sent by 
individuals in the news-centric core of Twitter users is closer to the 
mean political slant of the tweets that they receive from their 
followees than for people outside of the news-centric core. 
Yes  
Echo Chambers (EC)  
 1EC The mean political slant of news sources in tweets sent by 
individuals is the same as the mean political slant of the tweets 
that they receive from the people they follow. 
No No 
 2EC The smaller the standard deviation of political slant an account 
receives, the closer mean outgoing slant will be to mean incoming 
slant. 
No  
 3EC The greater the clustering around an individual, the closer the 
political slant in their own tweets is to the political slant in the 
tweets they receive from the people they follow. 
Yes  
Polarization (P)  
 1P The mean political slant of news sources in tweets by individuals 
is more extreme than the mean political slant of the tweets that 
they receive from the people they follow. 
No No 
 2P The larger the standard deviation of political slant an account 
receives, the more extreme outgoing slant is relative to incoming 
slant. 
Yes  
 4P The stricter the definition of what constitutes the news-centric 
core, the more extreme outgoing slant is, relative to incoming 
slant. 
Yes  
Mainstreaming (M)  
 1M The mean political slant of news sources linked to in an 
individual’s own tweets is more politically centrist than the mean 
political slant in the tweets they receive from the people they 
follow. 
Yes Yes 
 5Ma Outgoing political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network core. 
Yes  
 5Mb Incoming political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network core. 
No  
 5Mc Outgoing political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network periphery. 
Yes  
 5Md Incoming political slant is not a good description of the community 
structure of the network periphery. 
Yes  
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5. DISCUSSION 
5.1 Summary of empirical findings 
Overall, our results are only partially consistent with theories of echo chambers, 
polarization and mainstreaming.  A summary of hypothesis tests is presented in Table 10.  
Although small echo chambers may exist, we do not see clear evidence for them in the 
aggregate, and incoming slant only predicts outgoing slant with a lot of error.  We do find 
evidence of homophily (outgoing slant is correlated with incoming slant), but also an average 
tendency to moderation and many points of contact among different points on the political 
spectrum (see slant-permuted matrices in Figures 2 and 3).  We do see a polarized and active 
core in which network structure closely corresponds to political slant, but we also see a much 
larger (albeit much less active) generally moderating majority for which network structure is 
more weakly related to slant.  A diagrammatic summary of the overall communication structure 
is in Figure 4. The widespread concern over polarization may be due to the over-representation 
of tweets originating in the core, constituting a sort of network paradox (Feld, 1991).   As for 
mainstreaming, we do not find an absolute, but rather a relative tendency to political centrism. 
We also note that accounts outside of the core are tweeting across the political spectrum, which 
undermines a literal theory of a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).  
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Figure 4.: Summary diagram of connectivity patterns, distinguishing core from periphery. Overall, there is 
a tendency to centrism, but a majority of tweets received originate in the network core, which has a 
tendency to polarization. Grey circles represent accounts in the network core and periphery.  Circle size is 
proportionate to number of accounts. Arrows indicate percentage of total connectivity within and between 
core and periphery.  A: arrow size is proportional to total number of follower-followee relationships in the 
full data set and labeled with a percentage (e.g. 79.8% of all links are within the periphery). B: arrow size 
is proportional to (an upper bound on) the number of tweets received in the full data set, calculated as 
number of tweets sent multiplied by the number of news-active followers (accounts that sent at least one 
link to a news site) that those tweets were sent to (e.g. only 33.5% of all tweets received were both sent 
and received by accounts in the periphery).  
 
5.2 Broader implications 
5.2.1 What is read versus what is said 
In cross section, we find that communication patterns look very different when one looks 
at what is read (incoming information) instead of what is said (outgoing information).  This may 
have substantial consequences for our understanding of influence in social networks, which 
typically only looks at expressed behavior (analogous to what is said in the context of this study).  
For example, in a network study of influence in the spread of a product, an individual’s social 
media posts about that product could be interpreted as an expression of interest in the product or 
as the outward expression of desire to conform without any true interest in the product.   
Additionally, we find that the relationship between what is read and what is said is 
strikingly different in the network core from outside of it: core accounts tend to position 
themselves in a more extreme position than what they are exposed to, while the typical account 
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positions itself in a more moderate position. In the setting of influence in networks, it could well 
turn out that there is a similar regularity such that those within a core systematically express their 
preferences in an extreme or polarized manner, while those outside of the core systematically 
express their preferences in a moderate and dampened manner. 
Because of this marked heterogeneity between core and periphery, it is necessary to study 
communicating systems as a whole as we seek to understand the technologically mediated crowd 
that is of increasing importance in our evolving economy and society.   
 
5.2.2 The core versus the periphery in online communities: the “multiplex public” 
Like other social networks, online communities have a core-periphery structure 
(Dahlander and Fredriksen, 2012; Collier and Kraut, 2012; Wasko, Teigland and Faraj, 2009) 
and are composed of individuals with shared goals and interests that communicate over the 
internet (Preece, 2000), in a self-organized manner consisting of voluntary participation and 
without formal organization (Dahlander and O’Mahoney, 2011). Our data could therefore be 
considered an online community of political discussion with liberal and conservative sub-
communities, or alternatively, two overlapping communities in conflict with each other.  
In general, prior research has treated membership in the core versus the periphery as 
essentially an issue of the level of engagement in the community.  Some attention has been paid 
to how individuals end up in the core (Collier and Kraut, 2012; Dahlander and O’Mahoney, 
2011; Johnson, Safadi and Faraj, 2015), and the sources of motivation for “heavy weight” 
participants in the core compared to “light weight” participants in the periphery of an online 
community (Haythornthwaite, 2009).  Our results, however, reveal that those in the periphery are 
not only different from those in the core in terms of the amount of participation or reason for 
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participation in the community, but indeed also in terms of the very nature of their information 
sharing behavior.  Again, we find that on average, core members share links to more politically 
extreme news sources than the links they receive in their own timelines.  Periphery members, on 
the other hand, are the opposite.   
People tend to express themselves freely to the extent that the topic of conversation is 
consistent with their public or professional identity, and that their audience is homogenous 
(Marwick and boyd, 2010).  For most people these conditions do not apply, since they use a 
personal (rather than professional or other narrowly constructed public identity) social media 
account to connect to multiple contexts and identities (Rainie and Wellman, 2012; Hampton, Lee 
and Her, 2011; Marwick and boyd, 2010). In other words, most people cannot assume that their 
followers also follow each other, which accords with the fact that the periphery of a social 
network is not highly interconnected within itself by definition (Borgatti and Everett, 2000).  For 
people who both have a clear public identity and surround themselves with others with shared 
interests and goals – in other words, for members of the core – Marwick and boyd’s (2010) 
conditions for free expression are met.  This free expression could then be amplified by social 
influence (Centola and Macy, 2007; Shore, Bernstein and Lazer, 2015) and made more extreme 
by group polarization processes (Sunstein, 2002). 
If individuals in the core and the periphery have different characteristic behaviors and 
social environments, then lumping them together under the single term “community” is 
insufficient.  Instead, a new term is needed to describe this social structure that is most pervasive 
in our data.  We offer the term “multiplex public” to describe the social structure that such 
typical users of social networking services inhabit.  “Multiplex” refers to the multiple network 
layers (a work network, a school network, a friend network and so on) that come together to 
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form the overall follower-followee network, and “public” emphasizes the environment that is 
neither a single cohesive community nor a disconnected crowd, but in which individuals are still 
visible to sparsely-connected others. 
We suggest that this multiplex public has received less attention in the past in part 
because it has not been an obvious source of peer production.  Because of their economic 
consequence, online communities and crowds have been obvious and important to researchers in 
and around the disciplines of management.  Now, as data science uses digital traces for all 
manner of social scientific and business intelligence purposes, we should also acknowledge the 
significance of this prominent social structure and identify the ways it diverges from cohesive 
groups and network cores in future research. 
5.2.3 Research methods 
Network research nearly always faces a boundary definition problem (Laumann, Marsden 
and Prensky, 1989): the researcher must define who is in and who is out of the research data.  As 
a matter of convenience, this often means selecting nodes on the basis of their activity; in the 
case of political slant, prior work has sampled people to study on the basis of their obvious 
political partisanship (Adamic and Glance, 2005; Conover, et al, 2011; Bakshy, Messing and 
Adamic, 2015; Barbera et al.,2015).  While all of these studies go to some lengths to account for 
their data collection strategy, at a certain level they cannot fully escape the fundamental 
limitations that come with sampling on clearly political activity or affiliation.  That partisans are 
polarized does not imply that social media users in general are polarized.   
 The implications for future research on social media are clear: the behavior of members 
of the core is not representative of people outside of the core.  Networks constructed by choosing 
obviously relevant individuals (because they post a lot about the research topic, for example) are 
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likely to consist only of the network core and leave out the more representative (in terms of 
ordinary users) periphery.  
 
5.3 Limitations 
 Although our data is broadly representative in terms of its inclusion of typical Twitter 
users, our coverage consists of a cross-section in a non-election year.  This means that we cannot 
speak to issues of influence or other dynamic processes on or of networks – only the cross-
sectional organization of Twitter. More importantly, however, is the fact that our data was 
collected from a relatively “typical” period of time: 2009 was not an election year and September 
10th-23rd (the data collection window) did not contain any major news stories9 that might spark 
an increase in partisan conflict.  If the data were collected at an atypically polarized time, we 
may have observed different results.   Finally, Twitter was 3 years old when the data were 
collected, so while it no longer was only the home of early adopters, it had not yet gained the 
reach and user base that it has today. It is impossible to say for certain how this might affect 
results if this study could be exactly replicated with current data.  To at least partially address 
these concerns we conducted robustness checks with current (2017) data that do agree with our 
main results and are presented in Appendix A. 
 A second set of limitations comes with our use of Gentzkow and Shapiro’s slant scores.  
Although they cover over 95% of all direct news browsing and an even higher percentage of 
exposure to news on social media, we do not cover all sources of news.  We cannot rule out the 
possibility that there are echo chambers built around the sharing of news from sites representing 
a tiny minority of news exposures, including those from hate sites.  Indeed, if there were a total 
                                                     
9See  http://www.infoplease.com/year/2009.html#us 
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absence of such phenomena at the fringe, it would be surprising. However, this doesn’t affect our 
results, which characterize the vast majority of news exposures on Twitter.  Our robustness 
checks in Appendix A use a broader set of news sources than Gentzkow and Shapiro, and are 
intended to at least partially allay these concerns as well.   
 Our calculation of incoming slant is limited to those tweets that each account received 
from their followees in their timelines.  We do not account for information received off of 
Twitter, or for any tweets than a user is exposed to through other means, such as searching for 
hashtags, reading “trending” topics, reading the tweets from users that one does not already 
follow (more recently, this list includes “promoted” tweets, that is, advertisements).  We cannot 
say for certain how this might affect our results, but one possibility is that if people 
systematically searched for information from the opposite side of the political spectrum, it could 
result in undetected polarization, because their true incoming slant would be more centrist than 
we have measured it. 
A relative strength of our study is the inclusion of nearly every account that shared a 
news link during the collection period and thus had a measurable behavior.  But what about those 
accounts without any measurable behavior with respect to our slant measure?  A rough estimate 
is that our population of ~208,000 accounts that tweeted and received a news link represents only 
about 2.5% of monthly active users10. It is hard to say how our results would relate to the 97.5% 
of accounts that did not tweet any news links whatsoever during our data collection window.  
Given the diversity of interests – especially popular culture – represented on Twitter, it is likely 
that for quite a number of these excluded individuals, their twitter behavior is simply orthogonal 
                                                     
10 We are not aware of a reliable estimate for the number of monthly active users for the data collection period.  
Extrapolating backwards from information in Twitter’s filing of form S-1 with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission on October 3, 2011, it would appear that there were approximately 8 million monthly active 
users in the United States at the time of our data collection 
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to the issues we are studying.  However, other individuals may have participated in political 
communication through other means than sharing a news article; what can we say about these 
accounts? We found that the fewer news links an account sent out, the more centrist they tended 
to tweet relative to the information they received. Extrapolating from this, one might conclude 
that those who sent no news links would be even more mainstream (if that were measurable).  On 
the other hand, there could well exist very political individuals who simply to not share links to 
news stories, and instead write their own opinions in their own words.  If these users are 
somehow systematically different from our study population, then we may be missing some 
important part of the broader phenomenon of information diversity on Twitter. 
Finally, we study incoming versus outgoing political slant for Twitter accounts. It is not 
warranted to extrapolate our results without major caveats to conclusions about the true ideology 
of individual people.   There is also the possibility that some subset of users share articles they 
disagree with, which would complicate interpretation of our results.  We conducted exploratory 
analyses of this issue, and could not find much evidence of this effect in our data set.  A 
complete answer to this question, however, would require a separate full research project and is 
outside of the scope of this article.  Accounts also do not necessarily correspond to individuals; 
rather, they can also be run by organizations or algorithms.  Apart from some very obvious cases, 
it is hard to distinguish organizations from individuals on Twitter.  Individuals whose 
professional work involves participating in public discussion of news (reporters, academics, 
authors, public figures and so on) can have accounts that promote those individuals’ “personal 
brands” and in some cases may even be run by a private social media team. The line between 
individuals and organizations is blurry in the public forum of Twitter.  If we consider, for 
convenience, the network core to have a higher density of organizational accounts, then it could 
48 
 
be slightly reassuring that repeating our analyses with only accounts in the periphery produced 
almost identical estimated parameters for the effect of outgoing slant on incoming slant as those 
in Table 4.  As for algorithms, robustness checks in Appendix A on a small set of accounts are 
suggestive that our main results hold after excluding bots. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
By using data representative of the whole population of Twitter users, we were able to 
reconcile apparently contradictory theories of diversity of information sharing on Twitter.  The 
aggregate picture cannot be described as just a collection of echo chambers on the one hand, or a 
clear pattern of mainstreaming on the other.  Rather, with elements of both tendencies, we 
instead see a whole system comprising a vast moderating majority – a multiplex public – with a 
polarized two-part community at its core.  Predicted behavior depends on which part of the 
system you are looking at, but on average, Twitter accounts post more centrist information than 
they receive in their own timelines, undercutting the prevailing narrative of the social media echo 
chamber (e.g. Schmidt, et al, 2017).  Instead, the widespread perception of such polarization may 
be the result of a network paradox, in which the behavior of nodes with a high degree is mistaken 
to be typical (Feld, 1991). 
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APPENDIX A: Robustness check on recent data 
SUMMARY 
We conducted an extensive robustness check on recent (Feb-March, 2017) data.  We calculated 
our own measure of slant by analyzing patterns of co-following among people who follow news 
sources directly.  We then assembled a sample of Twitter users and analyzed incoming versus 
outgoing slant.  To the extent that we were able to conduct analogous analyses, our main result 
stands with current data.   
  
A1: CALCULATION OF SLANT SCORE 
In our main analysis we had an externally validated measure of slant that corresponded to 
the same period in time that our data was from.  We felt that the measures from 2009 were much 
too old to rely on for current data, and that many important news sources (for example, 
Wikileaks and fivethirtyeight.com) had arisen in the intervening years. We thus devised our own 
measure that was closely related in principle to the measure from Gentzkow and Shapiro for the 
2009 data.  In particular, we use their notion that bias is captured by audience segregation. In 
their methods, a news site was deemed conservative (i.e. having a positive slant) if it was 
relatively heavily-read by conservative people and had relatively few liberal people among its 
audience.  News sites with centrist scores (near zero) were read by both conservative and liberal 
people.  We adapt this idea to Twitter data as detailed here.  
We began by identifying news sources to include in our slant calculations.  We created a 
list of 186 different sources, including most of the sources from the 2009 data (we excluded 
sources without at least 10,000 followers on Twitter, as well as blogtalkradio.com, because it is a 
platform for others to share their content and at this point in time does not have a predictable 
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slant). We then extended the original list by searching for curated lists of political news sources 
and added all of those as well (limiting our sources to those that had at least 10000 followers on 
Twitter).  We also separated CNN politics from the rest of CNN, the Wall Street Journal opinion 
section from the rest of the Wall Street Journal, and the Politics and Black Voices sections from 
the rest of the Huffington Post, as those divisions are thought to have a different slant from the 
rest of the reporting on those sites, according to multiple comments we read. 
We then identified the main twitter handle of each of these news sources and used the 
Twitter API to download the lists of direct followers of these news sources.  This step took 
approximately 7 weeks of continuous querying of the API in order to collect 330,000,000 
follower relationships to our list of 186 news sources (these 7 weeks were divided across 
multiple developer accounts so the actual time spent collecting data was closer to two weeks).   
Collecting data at this scale necessitated building a collection script that was robust to 
undocumented behaviors of the API.   
Having collected the lists of followers, we then calculated a 186x186 affinity matrix, the 
entries of which represent how much each pair of news sources overlapped in terms of followers.   
For example, at the time of data collection, the New York Times had approximately 33,000,000 
followers on Twitter, and the Blaze (Glenn Beck) had approximately 616,000 followers; about 
165,700 people followed both sites, which is 26.9% of the size of the smaller audience.  We thus 
use 0.269 as the entry in our affinity matrix for the strength of the connection between the New 
York Times and the Blaze.  In general, denoting our affinity matrix as A, 
   Aij = 
|Followersi∩Followersj|
min(|Followersi|,|Followersj|)
 
where |X| denotes the cardinality of set X. 
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Ultimately, our slant scores are calculated from this raw affinity matrix. However, 
analogous to Gentzkow and Shapiro’s method, we needed to first identify subsets of news 
sources that were clearly embedded in a partisan cluster such that we had a basis for 
approximating partisan audiences. The intention behind this is to use co-following of sites in the 
conservative cluster as an indicator of conservatism, and co-following of sites in the liberal 
cluster as an indicator of liberalism.  
However, as others have recently pointed out (e.g. Benkler et al.’s preliminary report on 
their research here: http://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php), the 
conservative news cluster is clearly distinct, while the liberal news cluster is more integrated 
with the mainstream news cluster (that is, people who follow news sources with a liberal slant 
also follow mainstream news sources more than people who follow news sources with a 
conservative slant do), as Figure A1 illustrates. Because of this overlap, community detection 
algorithms run on the raw affinity matrix tend to divide the news site co-following network into 
only two, rather than three communities.  However, in order to calculate an analogous measure 
of slant to the one in our main analysis, we needed to identify which sites were in the less distinct 
smaller cluster of clearly liberal-leaning sites.   
As an intermediate step, we analyzed a scaled version of the matrix rather than the raw 
matrix to emphasize the community structure and provide a clearer signal of partisan separation. 
In particular, we reasoned that some co-following is to be expected if only based on random 
chance.  For example, for a very small niche news site, it wouldn’t be terribly surprising if a 
substantial fraction of its audience also followed CNN or the New York Times.  Intuitively, the 
smaller the first site, the less surprising it would be if a large fraction of its audience also 
followed larger news sites as well.  Thus, we scale the entries in the affinity matrix by the ratio 
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of the natural logs of the number of followers for each news site.  This penalizes co-following 
with sites that are much larger and emphasizes co-following that is more unexpected with respect 
to relative audience size.   After thus scaling the matrix, we removed all edges with scaled 
weight less than 0.3 and trimmed nodes with resulting degree less than 5.  These latter steps 
emphasize stronger connections and greater embeddedness in communities. We then ran the spin 
glass-based community detection algorithm (J. Reichardt and S. Bornholdt: Statistical Mechanics 
of Community Detection, Phys. Rev. E, 74, 016110 (2006)) on this pre-processed network to 
find three clear communities. 
   
  
Figure A1: Visualization of raw affinity matrix (note that for the purposes of this 
visualization only, weak ties (those less than 0.25) are omitted).   
 
Conservative 
Liberal 
Mainstream 
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Having thus identified nodes belonging to a liberal and a conservative cluster, we return 
to the raw affinity matrix to calculate slant scores (that is, the pre-processed version of the matrix 
was only used to detect membership in the three clusters).  For each news site, we calculated the 
mean co-following between that site and sites in the liberal cluster divided by the mean co-
following with all sites in the network and multiplied that by negative one to represent the 
liberal-leaning tendency.  We then added that to the mean co-following between that site and 
sites in the conservative cluster divided by the mean co-following with all sites in the network to 
represent the conservative leaning slant.  This sum represents the estimated slant for each site 
about which we collected data. 
 
𝑆𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 = −1 ∗
(
 
 
1
|𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙|
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗1≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛,
𝑗∈𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝑖,𝑗,𝑗≠𝑖 
)
 
 
+ 1 ∗
(
 
 
1
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1
𝑛
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)
 
 
 
 
Our resulting estimated slant scores correspond fairly well to other published measures of 
slant, such as Pew Research Center’s 2014 report on political polarization 
(http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/pj_14-10-
21_mediapolarization-08/).   The correlation between our slant scores and Gentzkow and 
Shapiro’s 2009 scores is 0.79; the two news sources with difference between our score and 
Gentzkow and Shapiro’s scores are the hotairblog.com and breitbart.com.  Both were relatively 
new at the time of Gentzkow and Shapiro’s data collection, and Breitbart has been documented 
to have evolved substantially since 200911.     
                                                     
11 see, for example, “From agitator to enforcer: The evolution of Breitbart” at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/from-agitator-to-enforcer-the-evolution-of-
breitbart/2017/02/19/9714b4ce-f3b8-11e6-9fb1-2d8f3fc9c0ed_video.html 
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Because liberals are more likely to be exposed to mainstream news sources, a truly 
unbiased source would not necessarily have a slant score of zero.  Note, for example, that C-
SPAN, a source that largely presents footage of congress without commentary, has an estimated 
slant score of approximately -0.29 on the scale for our 2017 data (which is on a different scale 
than Gentzkow and Shapiro’s slant scores).  Estimated slant scores are plotted in Figure A2 and 
reported in full in Table A2, below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: estimated slant scores for robustness check. The logarithm of the number of 
followers is on the vertical axis. 
 
 
A2: COLLECTION OF DATA ON INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS 
 
As indicated above, only a minority of Twitter accounts actually tweet links to news 
articles; sampling accounts at random (to the extent that is possible) to find those that both 
received and sent tweets containing links to news articles would be prohibitively expensive in 
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terms of time.  In order to find accounts more efficiently, we instead began by searching for 
tweets containing links to news stories, find the accounts that sent these tweets, and then 
searching among the followers of these accounts until we found those that also tweeted at least 
one link.  Using this method, we obtain the full recent timeline (up to 3200 tweets, including 
only those less than or equal to two weeks old) for both the upstream followee and the 
downstream follower. We use the mean slant of the followee’s tweets as a predictor variable and 
the mean slant of the follower as the dependent variable in regressions that we use as a 
robustness check of our main result. 
Because of the extremely slow process of finding accounts that fit our criteria, our largest 
set of data contains only the slant of this single followee, rather than the entire incoming timeline 
of a given follower to predict that follower’s outgoing slant.  This obviously introduces 
substantial error (including attenuation bias) that was not present in our initial analysis, in which 
we had the entire incoming timeline for every account in our dataset.  We have two reasons to 
believe that the error introduced by this method may not be as problematic as it sounds.  First, 
the followees that we find by sampling on tweets (i.e. searching for tweets with the search API) 
are likely to be more representative of the timeline than a followee picked at random; this is 
because sampling on tweets is more likely to find especially active tweeters, whose tweets make 
up a majority of follower’s incoming timelines.  Second, for a subset of data, we also collected 
expanded incoming timelines and found generally consistent regression results. 
Our full algorithm for collecting individual-level data is below, but before detailing that, 
we begin by defining a subroutine – “PROCESS URLS” -- used repeatedly throughout our data 
collection.  For example, we frequently needed to determine the slant of the most recent 3200 
tweets sent by a given account.  URLs in tweets are always shortened links – that is, the original 
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full URL is converted into a shorter version by Twitter (using the t.co domain) and possibly 
other shortening services such as bit.ly.  This means that the links in any tweet data we collected 
are totally opaque with respect to where they point.     
PROCESS URLS:  Given a set of tweets containing URLS, we begin by discarding any 
that are more than two weeks old.  We then follow each link until there are no further redirects 
and collect the URL at the final destination.  We then strip away protocol and server names 
(“http://” or “https://” and “www” or other leading information) and match to the list of news 
domains we created above, discarding any tweets without links to a news source on our list. 
 
Collection Algorithm 
We query the search API for Tweets containing hyperlinks.  We then PROCESS URLS (as 
above) for these tweets and call remaining tweets “seed tweets”.  For each seed tweet, we look 
up the account that sent the tweet, designating this account as “followee.”  If the followee has 
greater than 10,000 followers, stop and move on to the next tweet without recording data  Query 
the REST API for the most recent 3200 tweets sent by the followee and then PROCESS URLS 
and calculate the average slant of news tweets sent by the followee. We then query the API for 
the list of accounts that follow the followee.  Until we find a follower that sent a news link, loop 
over the following steps: {randomly select one follower, query the API for the most recent 3200 
tweets sent by that follower, PROCESS URLS} (if no followers tweeted a news link, stop and 
move on to the next seed tweet). Calculate the average slant of the follower.  Store data and 
move on to the next seed tweet. 
 
 
60 
 
Further robustness checks 
The above collection algorithm allows us to regress a follower’s outgoing slant on the outgoing 
slant of an account that they follow.  Two substantial concerns with this approach are as follows: 
(1) in 2017, the number of “bots” (accounts that are not run by a human, but rather by a piece of 
computer code) has reportedly increased on Twitter and (2) it is unclear how representative one 
followee account would be of the whole incoming timeline (notwithstanding our note that 
because the followee is sampled on tweet activity, they are likely to be more representative than 
the average followee).  To check the magnitude of any effects caused by these issues, we 
conducted further robustness checks on a subset of data. 
 
Bot check: the Truthy team at Indiana University recently released an API to their “Bot or not” 
service (http://truthy.indiana.edu/botornot/).  Essentially, this is a machine-learning based 
classifier of twitter accounts that produces a score, ranging from zero to one, with one being 
highest certainty that the account in question is a bot.  We took a subset of followers from our 
main collection algorithm and used the botornot API to provide a bot score.  We then kept only 
those accounts that scored less than 0.4.  
 
Expanded timeline: with the subset of accounts unlikely to contain many bots, we then 
expanded the number of followees in the “incoming slant” calculation.  We did not attempt to 
include all followees, because of feasibility constraints imposed by Twitter’s rate limits and the 
requirement to PROCESS URLS. Instead, using the insight from the main analysis of 2009 data 
that heavier tweeters tend to tweet less centrist material we obtained timelines from only the top 
20 heaviest tweeters from among each follower’s followees.  This also has the advantage that the 
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more an account tweets, the more representative of the whole incoming slant they are, all else 
equal. 
 
A3: RESULTS 
Results from these robustness checks are presented in Table A1.  Our main result, that on 
average outgoing slant is more moderate than incoming slant stands with these current data.  
These new data are much less complete than our main analysis and necessarily introduce some 
sampling bias of unknown magnitude.  However, they were collected at a time of greater 
maturity of the Twitter platform and a time of much greater apparent political polarization – 
during the first months of the Trump administration – than the data for the main analysis.  
 Because of the different approaches to data collection, a detailed interpretation of 
differences between parameter estimates from 2009 to 2017 is generally not warranted.  
However, one substantial difference is attributable to the sampling approach and we note it here.  
The parameter for the interaction between incoming slant and number of followers was large and 
significant in our main analysis, but insignificant here.  This is almost certainly because we only 
collected data for accounts with fewer than 10,000 followers for this robustness check; thus there 
is much less variation in this variable by construction. 
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Table A1 Relationship between incoming and outgoing political slant 
 DV: Mean slant of sites in outgoing tweets 
 I II‡ 
Mean slant, sites in  incoming tweets† 0.586 *** 0.751 *** 
0.010  0.032  
ln(Count of outgoing tweets)  0.064 *** 0.007  
0.010  0.034  
ln(# followers) 0.048 *** 0.094  
0.014  0.048  
ln(# followers) ÷ ln(#followees) -0.027  -0.016  
0.014  0.048  
Incoming slant x  
  ln(Count outgoing tweets)  
0.154 *** 0.093 ** 
0.010  0.033  
Incoming slant x  
  ln(# followers) 
0.009  0.038  
0.014  0.048  
Inc. slant x ln(#followers) ÷ ln(#followees) 0.036 * 0.011  
0.017  0.057  
Intercept -0.049 *** -0.009  
0.010  0.033  
# of Twitter accounts  5966  445  
Adjusted R2 0.419  0.589  
Notes:  standard errors are printed below parameter estimates. 
***: p< 0.001; **: p< 0.01;  *: p < 0.05 
Except for mean incoming slant and mean outgoing slant, all variables are centered and scaled 
to unit variance 
† For model I, incoming tweets originate from one sampled followee.  For Model II, incoming 
tweets originate from the top 20 most-frequent tweeters among that account’s followees 
‡Model II includes a subset of accounts that have a low probability of being bots and have fuller 
incoming slant information 
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Table A2: estimated slant scores for 2017 data 
Twitter handle URL 
estimated 
slant 
ABC http://ABCNews.com -0.241 
AboveTopSecret http://www.abovetopsecret.com 0.916 
abscbndotcom http://www.ABS-CBN.com 0.048 
ACLJ http://www.ACLJ.org 3.232 
ACLU http://www.aclu.org -1.861 
AJEnglish http://aljazeera.com -0.823 
AllenWest http://www.allenbwest.com 3.229 
AlterNet http://www.AlterNet.org -2.238 
amprog http://www.americanprogress.org -2.267 
AmericanThinker http://www.americanthinker.com 3.384 
AOL http://www.aol.com -0.317 
AP http://www.ap.org -0.245 
azcentral http://www.azcentral.com 0.306 
BBC http://www.bbc.co.uk -0.355 
billmaher http://www.billmaher.com/ -1.415 
oreillyfactor http://www.billoreilly.com 2.591 
BlackAmericaWeb http://www.blackamericaweb.com -1.227 
Blklivesmatter http://www.blacklivesmatter.com -1.971 
Blogcritics http://blogcritics.org/ -0.144 
business http://www.bloomberg.com -0.158 
BoingBoing http://www.boingboing.net -1.310 
BostonGlobe http://bostonglobe.com -0.517 
bostonherald http://www.bostonherald.com 0.617 
BreitbartNews http://breitbart.com 2.978 
businessinsider http://businessinsider.com/ -0.083 
BW http://www.businessweek.com -0.130 
BuzzFeedNews http://www.buzzfeed.com/news -0.657 
cspan http://www.c-span.org -0.294 
CanadaDotCom http://www.canada.com -0.456 
CatoInstitute http://www.cato.org/ 2.053 
CBCNews http://www.cbc.ca/news/ -0.313 
CBSNews http://CBSNews.com -0.169 
chicagotribune http://chicagotribune.com -0.446 
chicksonright http://chicksontheright.com 3.452 
CTmagazine http://christianitytoday.com 1.910 
HoustonChron http://www.chron.com 0.250 
CNBC http://cnbc.com -0.057 
CNET http://www.cnet.com -0.108 
CNN http://www.cnn.com -0.273 
CNNPolitics http://cnn.com/politics -0.648 
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cnsnews http://facebook.com/cnsnewscom 3.137 
NatCounterPunch http://counterpunch.org -1.575 
crooksandliars http://www.crooksandliars.com/ -2.409 
csmonitor http://www.CSMonitor.com -0.372 
CTVNews http://www.ctvnews.ca -0.079 
DailyCaller http://www.dailycaller.com 2.728 
dailykos http://www.dailykos.com -2.176 
demunderground http://www.democraticunderground.com -2.227 
DNC https://democrats.org/ -1.990 
DRUDGE_REPORT http://www.DRUDGEREPORT.com 2.312 
Earthfiles http://www.earthfiles.com 0.390 
TheEconomist http://www.economist.com -0.390 
EFF https://www.eff.org -0.884 
esquire http://www.esquire.com -0.891 
MichaelSalla http://exopolitics.org/ 0.179 
Daily_Express http://www.express.co.uk 0.630 
YahooFinance http://finance.yahoo.com 0.138 
firstdraftnews http://firstdraftnews.com -0.865 
FiveThirtyEight http://www.fivethirtyeight.com -1.017 
Forbes http://forbes.com -0.028 
ForeignPolicy http://www.foreignpolicy.com -0.444 
FOXLA http://www.foxla.com 0.556 
FoxNews http://www.foxnews.com 1.157 
CanoeNouvelles http://fr.canoe.ca/ -0.239 
FreeBeacon http://FreeBeacon.com 2.960 
Snowden https://freedom.press -0.355 
FreeRepublicTXT http://www.freerepublic.com 0.176 
fpmag http://frontpagemag.com 3.287 
FT http://www.ft.com/ -0.127 
GallupNews http://www.gallup.com 0.613 
glennbeck http://www.glennbeck.com 2.754 
globeandmail http://www.globeandmail.com -0.336 
GOP http://gop.com 2.011 
haaretzcom http://www.haaretz.com 0.168 
seanhannity http://hannity.com 2.781 
HarvardBiz http://hbr.org -0.494 
HeraldTribune http://www.heraldtribune.com 0.182 
Heritage http://heritage.org 2.705 
hotairblog http://hotair.com 3.352 
HuffingtonPost http://www.huffingtonpost.com -0.730 
blackvoices http://www.huffingtonpost.com/black-voices/ -1.425 
HuffPostPol http://www.huffingtonpost.com/politics -1.291 
HumanEvents http://www.HumanEvents.com 3.228 
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TheIJR http://ijr.com 2.036 
infowars http://www.infowars.com 2.430 
zittrain http://www.jz.org -0.930 
latimes http://latimes.com/ -0.454 
lessig http://lessig.org -1.347 
LifeNewsHQ http://www.LifeNews.com 3.075 
LifeSite http://www.lifesitenews.com 3.060 
MarketWatch http://www.marketwatch.com/ 0.119 
mashable http://mashable.com -0.614 
Mediaite http://www.Mediaite.com 0.788 
mmfa http://mediamatters.org/ -1.929 
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RedState http://www.redstate.com 3.027 
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TheWeek http://www.TheWeek.com -0.576 
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